Quantifying Alignment and Safeguarding AI in Social Decision-Making

The recent developments in the research area of autonomous decision-making and social impact highlight a shift towards more robust and verifiable methods for ensuring the alignment and safety of AI agents in critical applications. Researchers are increasingly focusing on defining and achieving 'probably approximately aligned' policies, which offer near-optimal solutions while maintaining safety guarantees. This approach leverages utility and social choice theory to quantify alignment and introduces methods to safeguard autonomous agents' actions, ensuring they are verifiably safe for society. Additionally, there is a growing interest in data-driven approaches to learning aggregation rules in participatory budgeting, which aim to balance social welfare and representation by training neural networks on participatory budgeting instances. These methods not only learn existing rules but also generate new ones that adapt to diverse objectives, offering more nuanced solutions for budget allocation processes. Furthermore, the field is addressing the problem of social cost in multi-agent general reinforcement learning by proposing market-based mechanisms to quantify and control social harms, with a focus on general environments and diverse learning strategies. This approach aims to mitigate collateral damage from AI agents pursuing narrow objectives, contributing to safer multi-agent interactions.

Noteworthy papers include one that introduces a novel quantitative definition of alignment in social decision-making and proposes a method to safeguard autonomous agents' policies, ensuring their actions are verifiably safe. Another paper presents a data-driven approach to learning aggregation rules in participatory budgeting, which can generate new rules that adapt to diverse objectives, providing a more nuanced solution for budget allocation. Lastly, a paper addresses the problem of social cost in multi-agent reinforcement learning by proposing market-based mechanisms to quantify and control social harms, with applications to the Paperclips problem and pollution control.

Sources

Can an AI Agent Safely Run a Government? Existence of Probably Approximately Aligned Policies

Learning Aggregation Rules in Participatory Budgeting: A Data-Driven Approach

The Problem of Social Cost in Multi-Agent General Reinforcement Learning: Survey and Synthesis

Sequential Payment Rules: Approximately Fair Budget Divisions via Simple Spending Dynamics

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