The recent research in social choice theory has seen significant advancements in the areas of metric distortion, distributed facility location, and equilibrium computation in spatial competition models. A notable trend is the exploration of multi-candidate scenarios, where committees of candidates are considered to improve approximation bounds compared to single-candidate deterministic algorithms. This approach has yielded promising results in line metrics, extending to both utilitarian and egalitarian objectives. Additionally, the study of distributed facility location games has provided new insights into strategyproof mechanisms and their distortion bounds, particularly in the context of both desirable and obnoxious facility settings. The computational challenges of equilibrium computation in the Hotelling-Downs model have also been addressed, offering algorithms for both continuous and discrete scenarios. Furthermore, the dynamics of voter priming campaigns have been analyzed, revealing new strategies and equilibrium conditions in multi-issue, multi-party settings. These developments collectively push the boundaries of social choice theory, offering more robust and practical solutions to real-world decision-making problems.